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RECENT CASES
ARSON-EVIDENCE-MOTIVE.-STATE v. BARRETT, 65 S. E. 894 (N. C.).
-In a trial for the burning of a barn it was held, that the state could, to
establish the motive of the accused, show that bad feelings existed between
accused and the owner of the barn and the reason for it, and the owner
may testify that he has opposed the accused's application to a membership
in a society.
In general, where arson has been committed and circumstances point to
the accused as the perpetrator, any facts tending to show a motive for the
crime are admissible in evidence. People v. Murphy, 135 N. Y. 450. Un-
friendly feelings between the accused and the owner of a building may be
shown; Shepherd v. People, ig N. Y. 537; but it is improper to inquire
into the cause of the quarrel as it would tend to arouse a prejudice against
the defendant. State v. Hannett, 54 Vt. 83. It has also been held im-
proper to inquire into the unfriendliness of defendant's family with the
prosecutor's wife to show motive. Bell v. State, 74 Ala. 42o. However,
the existence of friendly relations without reference to the time at which
such feelings were entertained, cannot be shown to establish a want of
motive. Commonwealth v. Cornelly, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 77. And conversa-
tions may be admitted to show defendant's threats as to the future;
People v. Lattimore, 86 Cal. 403; and notwithstanding the lapse of a
long time between the acts of manifesting hostile relations and the com-
mission of the offense, such difficulties may be shown to connect the per-
son with the offense. Hudson v. State, 61 Ala. 333.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PERSONAL LIBERTY-MEASUREMENT UNDER BER-
TILL N SysTE.-DowNs V. SWANN, 73 ATL. 653 (MD.).-Held, that to
photograph and measure under the Bertillon system a person arrested on
a felony charge, but before conviction, does not violate the personal liberty
secured him by the Constitution of the United States.
A sheriff may lawfully take photograph and measurements of an ac-
cused person if in his discretion it is necessary to prevent his escape.
State v. Chamberlain, 154 Ind. 599. And a supposed criminal whose
photograph has been taken by the police, cannot have an exhibition there-
of enjoined on the ground that his right of privacy has been invaded.
Owen v. Partridge, 82 N. Y. Supp. 248. Some of the courts hold that if
a person is under arrest or within the court's jurisdiction, generally there
arises no necessity for taking photograph of accused before his trial and
conviction. Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 703. And in conflict with
the case at hand it has been held that the police department has no au-
thority to take measurements. Gow v. Bingham, i7 N. Y. Supp. Ion1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PERSONAL AND Civi. RIGHTS-PROHIBITING
RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN LAWFUL OccuPATIoN-CoLLEcTIoN OF GARBAGE.-
SMITH ET AL V. CITY OF SPOKANE, 104 PAC. 49 (WAsH.).-Held, that an
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ordinance creating a city crematory for garbage, and making the col-
lection of same by those not its officers unlawful, falls within the police
power, and does not deny the constitutional right to engage in a lawful
occupation.
The police power, or authority to make those rules which tend to
protect the health, life, and safety of the people, extends to every relation
in the state. Cooley's Const. Law, 3rd ed., pp. 250, 251. The courts are
the final judges of this power. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; In re
Jacobs, 98 N.. Y. 98. Everything prejudicial to the health or morals of
a city may be removed. Thurlow v. Commonwealth, 5 How. 504, 571.
Cities may prohibit peddling of certain kinds. Shelton v. City of Mobile,
3o Ala. 54o. But the attempt of a government to appropriate any in-
dustry not of a public nature is an invasion of constitutional rights.
Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545.
CONxTRACTs-BUILDING CONTRACTS-WAIVER OF BaAcH.-RYAxN v.
CUREw Co., 104 PAC. 218 (UTA) .- Held, that the fact that the con-
tractee in a building contract specifying the manner in which the work
should be done, made no objections as the work proceeded, did not pre-
clude him from asserting, when sued for the contract price, that the work
had not been done in accordance with the contract.
Mere knowledge of a breach of contract does not constitute a waiver
but there must be a formal release. Pope Mfg. Co. v. Rubber Goods Mfg.
Co., 97 N. Y. Supp. 73. But it has been held that objection that work
was not satisfactory comes too late if not made till after work was done.
Lyons v. Dymond, 23 La. Ann. 709. This rule has been followed on
ground that failure to reject defective construction amounts to a waiver.
Ashland Lime Co. v. Shores, 1o5 Wis. 122. Some courts hold that an
amount necessary to make the work such as contract calls for may be
deducted from the contract price. Katz v. Belford, 77 Cal. 319.
CORPORATIONs-NuISAI4E-LIABILITY TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.-PIC.-
ENS v. COAL RIVER Boom & TIMBER Co., 65 S. E. 865 (W. VA.).-Held,
that a state charter giving a corporation power to do work which would
otherwise be a nuisance, absolves the corporation from any liability as a
public nuisance, but does not exempt it from liability for damages to an
individual. Williams, J., dissenting.
A corporation acting under a charter giving it a power to do a public
act is not liable for injuries to property rights of individuals. Bailey v.
Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., 44 Am. Dec. 593. Nor is a corporation
responsible for the disturbance or injury to a franchise of another cor-
poration if it exercises its powers in a manner contemplated by its char-
ter. Bordentown & Turnpike Road Co. v. Camden & A. Railroad &
Transportation Co., 17 N. J. Law 314. But this is not so if it has in
some way forfeited its charter rights or the charter has been rightfully
modified by some statute. Gowen v. Penobscot R. Co., 44 Me. i4O. Nor
does the charter afford any protection to those acting under it, if it is
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either unconstitutional or void. Chenango Bridge Co. v. Paige, 83 N. Y.
178. But if the injury was direct and the work for which the corporation
was chartered was constructed with private capital and for private emolu-
ment, the corporation is liable for damages to property. Trenton Water
Power Co. v. Raff, 36 N. J. Law 335. Nor in such a case is the charter a
defense against a suit by a town. Hooksett v. Amoskeeg Mfg. Co., 44
N. H. io5. For unless the charter expressly grants the corporation the
right to operate so as to render it a nuisance, the mere fact of incor-
poration confers upon it no greater rights than those of a natural person in
the same situation. Powell v. Brookfield P. B. & Title Mfg. Co., io4 Mo.
App. 713. And the fact that there was no wilful or unnecessary damage
does not free it from liability. New Albany & S. R. Co. v. Huff, ig Ind.
315. And this is true, although no remedy is provided for in its charter.
Indiana Cent. R. Co. v. Boden, io Ind. 96. But if a certain remedy is
provided in the statute, that remedy only can be given. Hazen v. Essex
Co., 66 Mass. 475.
COURTS-PREVENTING INJURY TO REAL PRoPERTY-JuPISDIcTION OF
COURT.-CALIFORNIA DEVELOPMENT Co. v. NEW LIVERPOOL SALT Co., 172 FED.
792.-A court of equity having jurisdiction of the parties may, it was held,
enjoin a continuing injury to real property within its jurisdiction by flood-
ing caused by the improper construction of works maintained by defendant
for diverting the water of a river into a canal, although such works are
across the boundary within the republic of Mexico.
The weight of authority seems to be that where a court has juris-
diction over the parties, it may issue an injunction to enjoin a nuisance
arising in another jurisdiction. Ewing v. Ewing, 9 App. Cas. 34; Monnett
v. Turpie, 132 Ind. 482; Alexander v. Tolleston Club, iio Ill. 65. The
jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the place where the injury
is received. Georgia Central R. Co. v. Dorsey, x16 Ga. 719. It was held
in Stillman v. White Rock Mfg. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 13446, where there
was an injury to mills situated in one state by acts done in another, the
courts of the state in which the injury was done had a right of action
which they could enforce by injunction in the other state. Equity courts
of one state may also assume jurisdiction where a less circuitous and
better remedy can be given than is afforded by another state; Richardson
v. Williams, 56 N. C. 116; or grant relief in case of a doubtful jurisdic-
tion. Adriance v. New -York, i Barb. xg (N. Y.). But there is no juris-
diction to enjoin the doing of the threatened acts in another state nor to
compel the undoing of the same if done. At. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. B. & 0.
A. Co., 46 N. Y. Super Ct 377.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-EXHIMITION OF CHILD TO JURY.-STA2I V.
HUNT, 112 N. W. 90o2 (IA.).-Held, that in a prosecution for seduction, It
is error to exhibit prosecutrix's child, only a few months old, to the jury
to determine a supposed resemblance to the defendant.
It is well settled that evidence of a resemblance of a child to its
putative father, being but matter of opinion, is inadmissible. Eddy v.
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Gray, 4 Allen. 435 (Mass.); People v. Carney, 29 Hun. 47 (N. Y.). There
is, however, a decided conflict as to whether a bastard child may be ex-
hibited to the jury for the purpose of showing resemblance to the de-
fendant. It was held in Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 N. H. io8; Scott v.
Donovan, 153 Mass. 378, and Crow v. Jordan, 49 Ohio St. 655, that it
was proper to introduce the bastard child, while in Robnett v. People, I6
Ill. App. 299, and Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84, the contrary was held.
Some states make a distinction as to the age of the child, and in Hilton v.
State, 41 Tex., Cr. R. I9o, a child seven months old, was too young to be
admitted in evidence for proof of resemblance to its putative father. The
same was held of a child six weeks old. Clark v. Bradstreet, 8o Me., 454.
DxscovRY-IN EQUITY-STATUTORY REiEDY.-KEYSTONE LuMmm
YARD v. YAzoo & M. V. R. Co. ET AL,, 5o So. 445 (Miss.) -Held, that
the chancery court has jurisdiction of a bill for discovery, though plaintiff
may have legal means of obtaining proof.
The theory of a bill of discovery in equity is that it lies only where
courts of law are unable to compel disclosure of the party's knowledge.
Heath v. Erie Ry. Co., 9 Blatchf. 316; Riopelle v. Doellner, 26 Mich. io2.
This rule has been followed in many federal and state courts. Cecil Nat.
Bk. v. Thurber, 59 Fed. 913; Norwich & W. R. Co. v. Storey, 17 Conn.
364; Law v. Thorndyke, 37 Mass. 317; Fitzhugh v. Everingham, 2 Edw.
Ch. (N. Y.) 6o5. The same is held in Brown v. McDonald. T'o Fed.
964; but this decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in
133 Fed.. 8-97. Such a bill was held demurrable in Souza v. Belcher, 3
Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) IV; contra: Wood v. Hudson, 96 Ala. 469. But fol-
lowing decisions have allowed the bill even where there is a complete
remedy at law. Kelley v. Boettcher, 85 Fed. 59; Garden City Sand Co. v.
People, 1i8 Ill. App. 372; Miller v. U. S. Casualty Co., 6i N. J. Eq. iio;
Elliston v. Hughes, 38 Tenn. 25.
HoMIcWE-AsSAULT WITH INTENT To KILL-DEFENsE-DRuNKENNESS.
-CHOWNING V. STATE, 121 S. W. 735 (ARx.).-Held, that in defense of a
prosecution for assault with intent to kill, it may be shown that at the
time of the assault accused was so drunk that he could not have enter-
tained the intent necessary to constitute the crime.
Proof of intent is essential in such a prosecution. Ward v. State, 58
Neb., 719. And where one is incapable of forming the specific intent
necessary, he cannot commit assault with intent to murder. State v. Di
Guglielmo, 4 Pennewill (Del.) 336. And drunkenness may be considered
by the jury, since it may have produced a state of mind unfavorable to
premeditation, thouglr not so great as to make him incapable of a deliberate
purpose. Lancaster v. State, 7o Tenn. 575. But intoxication cannot re-
duce assault with intent to murder to a mere assault. Jeffries v. State, 9
Tex. App. 598. And it has been held that intoxication which does not
amount to insanity is no defense in such a prosecution. Little v. State,
42 Tex. Cr. R. 55.
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INJUNCTION-PROSECUTION OF AcTioN.-VAN RIEMPST V. WEIHER, Ir6
N. Y. SuPP. 218.-Where a tenant sued to cancel a lease, claiming it was
induced by fraud, and alleged facts which, if established, might entitle
him to a cancellation, held, that he was entitled to have an action brought
by the landlord in the municipal court for rent, stayed until determination
of the action for cancellation. Clark and Scott, JJ., dissenting.
It is well established that fraud, accident, mistake, and discovery are
grounds upon which an injunction may be allowed to stay proceedings at
law. Diller v. Rosenthal, 6 Luz. Leg. Reg. 33 (Pa.). However, equity
will not enjoin an action at law when the party seeking the injunction has
a good defense at law. Savage v. Allen, 54 N. Y. 458. Thus, the weight
of authority, contrary to the ruling of the case under discussion, seems
to be, that where the facts relied on for an injunction against a common
law action are available as a defense to the action, an injunction will not
be granted. Peacock z. Irvine, 42 So. 894 (Fla.). But, although the facts
set up in the bill to enjoin an action at law may be used in defending
against that action, equity will not refuse relief unless the remedy thereby
offered is adequate. Bissell v. Beckwith, 33 Conn. 357. Thus, if an action
at law gives an unfair advantage to the adverse party, equity will interfere
and grant relief by injunction. Lindley v. Russell, I6 Mo. App. 217;
Long Dock Co. v. Bentley, 37 N. J. Eq. 15. Likewise, injunction may be
sought to restrain a suit at law where the latter only involves a portion
of the controversy, or is liable to leave an apparent record title clouding
the legal title in issue. Shaw v. Chambers, 48 Mich. 355.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-ILLEGAL SALES-DEvICES-CLUBs.-STATE V.
CITY CLUB, 65 S. E. 730 (S. C.).--Held, that when a so-called club is a
mere device to evade the law against the sale of intoxicating liquors, and its
real or main purpose is to provide liquors for its members at a price paid,
or agreed to be paid, there is a sale.
The rulings enforced upon this holding fhroughout the country appear
to vary considerably. It has been held, that, despite the fact that the
club is organized in good faith and not as a mere device to evade the law,
a social club, whether incorporated or not, which dispenses liquors to its
members at a price paid, or agreed to be paid, is within the statute re-
quiring dram shops to be licensed. South Shore Country Club v. State,
228 Ill. 75. And without qualification, the distribution of intoxicating
liquors among the members of a club is a sale within the law. State v.
Johns, 1i8 N. W. 295. But, contra, the furnishing of intoxicating liquors,
without profit, by a club organized and existing in good faith with a
limited and selected membership, does not constitute a sale within the
meaning of the statute. People v. Adelphi Clubk I49 N. Y. 5; Common-
wealth v. Ewing, 145 Mass. iig. Again it has been held that a statute
applying to barrooms also applies to social clubs, for a ruling prohibiting
a barroom from keeping open on Sunday also prohibits a social club from
keeping open its rooms on Sunday for the purpose of selling liquors to
its members. Beauvoir Club v. State, 148 Ala. 643.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEAsE-CREATION OF LIEN.-BRADFRD ET AL
v. ROBERTS, iO4 PAC. 391 (CoLo.).-Held, that a lease on a farm, giving
the lessor a share of the crops and the right, on the lessee's failing to do
the necessary work, to do it himself and deduct the value thereof from
the lessee's share of the crops, does not create a lien for the value of such
labor in the lessor's favor, and a chattel mortgage of the lessee on his
interest is good as against the lessor.
The landlord's lien on crops for rent and advances is created by a
lease of lands to be cultivated for a specific portion of the crops. Where
by the lease the lessee is to gather and deliver the lessor's share to him,
but fails, and the lessor does the necessary work, he has a lien for so
doing. Secrest v. Stivers, 35 Ia. 58o. But a lease contract, providing
that no grain should be sold or removed by the lessee, but such as remained
should be bought by the lessor, gives the latter no lien which he can en-
force against a bona fide mortgagee of the hay crop, without notice of the
terms of the lease. Marshall et al v. Luiz et al, 115 Cal. 622. And a
lease giving landlord first lien on the property of lessee as security for
rent is, in effect, a chattel mortgage, and if unrecorded gives a title in-
ferior to that created by an assignment for the benefit of lessee's creditors.
Packard v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 67 Ill. App. 598. Nor does a
provision that lessee shall dispose of no produce until payment of the
rent and other items, reserve a lien, and the produce may be attached as
the property of the lessee. Beers v. Field, 69 Vt. 533.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY FOR RENT-DEsTRUCTION OF Busi-
NEss.---O'BYRNE v. HENLEY, 50 SO. 83 (ALA.).-If the premises are
leased for the purpose of carrying on a certain business and such business
is totally destroyed, it is analogous to a physical destruction of the
premises, and the liability of the tenant to pay rent ceases.
The common law rule was that the tenant was liable for rent even
though the premises were destroyed by an unforeseen or inevitable acci-
dent, or by an act of the public enemy, unless otherwise stipulated. Taylor
on Landlord and Tenant, Sect. 377. However, where there was a stipu-
lation that the tenant should not be liable for rents if the premises or busi-
ness should be destroyed by such causes, it was held that acts of the law
were not included in this stipulation, but must be expressly stipulated in
order to be effective. Abadie v. Berges, 41 La. Ann. 281. It is pretty well
established that liability for rent does not cease because of an interference
by law subsequent to the lease, unless expressly provided. McLarren v.
Spalding, 2 Cal. 5xo; Nichols v. Byrne, ii La. z7O. And this is true even
though such law is passed before the commencement of the term. Kerley
v. Mayer, 31 N. Y. Supp. 818. When the interference with the beneficial
enjoyment is through no fault of the lessor, but through acts of private
persons, there is still liability for rent. Birch v. Favilla, Ioi N. Y. Supp.
970. But, upon the other hand, if the interference with or destruction of
the beneficial interest to the tenant is by the lessor, the tenant may abandon
the premises and have a good defense against a claim for rent. O'Neil v.
Mange, 44 Mo. App. 279; Myers v. Bernstein, io4 N. Y. Supp. 348. Yet
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there is no such defense if the tenant does not abandon the premises after
such constructive eviction. Higbie Co. v. Weeghman Co., 126 Ill. App. 97.
And to be justified in abandoning, the interference must be persisted in
and continued at the time of abandonment. Ryan v. Jones, 2o N. Y. Supp.
842.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-HoLDING PUBLIC OFFICIAL UP TO REPROACH.-
CHURCH v. NEW YORK TRIBUNE ASS'N., II8 N. Y. Supr. 626.-It was held
to be libelous per se if a publication fairly imputed that a public officer was
guilty of shirking and disregarding his duties, thereby holding him up to
reproach and ridicule.
The general rule is, that words are actionable per se which impute
to an official a wilful neglect of duty. Scougale v. Sweet, 124 Mich.. 311.
It is even stronger evidence of a libel per se if this neglect is characterized
as being'culpable and from improper motives. Larabee v. Minn. Tribune
Co., 36 Minn. 14r. And whether the publication amounts to a criminal
charge or not, as long as it tends to bring another into ridicule or disgrace,
it is actionable per se. Washington Times Co. v. Downey, 26 App. D. C.
258. But to render such words actionable at all, they must be published dur-
ing his term of office. McKee v. Wilson, 87 N. C. 300. Contra: Russell
v. Anthony, 21 Kans. 45o. And in determining whether the language is
libelous per se, it should be construed as a whole and its ordinary meaning
given to it. Daily v. N. Y. Herald Co., 151 Fed. ui4. No criticism of a
person holding a public office is libelous unless it is malicious. Town-
send on Slander and Libel, Sect. 254. Thus, if the words are published in
good faith and in the belief that they are true, public policy exempts one
from liability. Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 52r.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PoLIcE POWER-ORDINANCES--VALIDITY.-
-STATE v. PERRY, 65 S. E. 9r5 (N. C.).-Held, that under its police power
to protect the public health, a city may establish and control public markets
at which perishable food, such as fresh fish, shall be sold, and may prohibit
the vending by retail of such perishable food except at the public markets.
The right to establish markets has been treated as a branch of the
sovereign power. Bowling Green v. Carson, xo Bush. 64 (Ky.); Cougot
v. City of New Orleans, 16 La. Ann. 21. Still, in other jurisdictions,
cities are given power under their charters to establish markets. St. John
v. City of New York, 13 N. Y. Super. Ct. 315. On the other hand, the
right of regulating markets is necessarily a municipal police power. City
of New Orleans v. Morris, 3 Woods C. C. 107 (La.). But an ordinance
regulating the same may be declared void for unreasonableness, where it
is oppressive, unequal, unjust, or altogether unreasonable. City of Lamar
-v. Weidman, 57 Mo. App. 5o7. In Village of Buffalo v. Webster, io
Wend. 99 (N. Y.), it was held that a by-law, that meat should not be
sold except at a designated place, was good, not being a restraint of the
right to sell meat, but a regulation of that right. Likewise the city of
New Orleans may prohibit the sale of oysters in the city, except at certain
designated stands. Morano v. City of New Orleans, 2 La. 217. In lack-
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sonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163, there was a limitation to the rule that the
restricting of the sale to public markets of perishable food is not an illegal
restraint of trade or a monopoly, in that reasonable facilities for selling at
public markets must be given. And it has been held that such restrictions
are altogether void as being in restraint of trade and unreasonable. St.
Paul v. Laidler, 2 Minn. i9o.
PERPETUITIES-VALDITY OF CHARITABLE TRUST-REMOTENESS.-RUS-
SELl V. GnARD TRUST Co., 171 FED. 16i.-A settlor deposited $2,000 in
trust for the benefit of the State of Pennsylvania. It was to be invested
until it should so accumulate, together with any other sums deposited with
the trustee, that the whole debt of the state might be paid off. The in-
debtedness of the state at the time was $4o,oooooo. Held, that the trust
was void as it might exceed the limitation of the rule of remoteness or
accumulations.
The general rule seems to be that where there is an immediate gift
to trustees for certain charitable purposes, but the application will not take
effect except on the occurrence of an event uncertain in its nature, the gift
is valid, and the court will allow the trustee to hold the fund a reasonable
time to await the happening of the contingency. Jones v. Habersham, IO7
U. S. 174; Appeal of Goodrich, 57 Conn. 275. As in Almy v. Jones, 17
R. I. 265, it was held that a bequest to take effect when sufficient money
was raised to found an art institute was valid as a reasonable time would
be allowed for the performance of the conditions. But it has been held
that all devices or grants, whether for charitable purposes or otherwise,
must vest within the time limited by the rule against perpetuities. Jocelyn
v. Nott, 44 Conn. 55. The English rule is the same as the American, but
provides that a future gift conditional upon an uncertain event is subject
to the rule against perpetuities and is void ab initlo. In re White's Trusts,
33 Ch. Div. 449.
TELEGRAPHS -MENTAL ANGUISH - DAMAGES.-LYLES V. WESTERN
UNION TELEGRAPH Co., 65 S. E. 832 (S: C.).-Hld, that damages may
be recovered for mental anguish alone resulting from the non-delivery of
a massage, although this mental anguish was not suffered until after the
message had been delivered.
An examination of the adjudged cases shows that the great weight of
authority is against recovery of damages for mental suffering resulting
from negligent delay upon the part of the company, unless the mental
suffering is coupled with other injuries. Chase v. W. U. Tel. Co., 44 Fed.
554. Contra: W. U. v. Cline, 8 Ind. App. 364. And if the law expressly
provides that a company is liable for all actual damages sustained by its
failure to transmit a message within a reasonable time, a recovery for
mental suffering is not included. Francis v. W. U. Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252.
For the mental suffering is too uncertain and speculative to be an element
of damages. W. U. v. Wood, 57 Fed. 47r. And the fact that there was
not suspense during the delay, but only mental anguish subsequent to de-
livery does not affect the rule. Kester v. W. U. Tel. Co., 55 Fed. 6o3. But
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in cases when there was extreme delay under extreme circumstances, it has
been held that there can be a recovery for such suffering. Young V. W. U.,
io7 N. C. 370. Or if there was a wanton or malicious purpose on the part
of the company's agents, there may be a recovery. Crawson v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 47 Fed. 544. Also there can be a recovery if the agent can see
upon the face of the message that mental anguish will probably result if
not promptly delivered. Reese z. W. U., 123 Ind. 294; Sherrill v. W. U.,
i16 N. C. 655. Some courts have gone so far as to say that where there
is a right of action for breach of contract, there is also a right to recover
damages for mental suffering resulting therefrom. W. U. v. Henderson,
89 Ala. 510. In another court the doctrine was peculiarly applied, and it
was said that the sender may recover for the mental suffering of his wife,
but not his own, resulting from failure to deliver. W. U. Tel. Co. v.
Cooper, 71 Tex. 5o7.
TRUSTs-ABsooLuE GiFT-INTENT.-VICMMS v. VieCxRs, 6s S. E. 885
(GA.).-Held, that an absolute gift will not be cut down by implication
into a trust merely, because the donor, at the time he made the gift, hoped
and believed that the donee would permit him to participate in the bene-
ficial interest of the property.
A case similar to the above has arisen before which held that, where a
purchase of real estate is made iri the name of a wife, her husband paying
the consideration for the same, no trust, express or implied, will arise,
even though there may have been a mutual understanding to the contrary
at the time the purchase was made. Johnson v. Johnson, 16 Minn. 512.
And likewise where a husband assigns a judgment to his wife, he cannot
afterwards assert that she held the same in trust for him. Bunt v. Jones,
45 Mich. 392. These rulings seem to be contrary to that hard and fast
principle of trusts that where one pays the purchase price and the con-
veyance is taken in the name of another, a resulting trust in favor of the
one who paid the purchase price will arise; but this appears to be the
rule only in the case where the purchaser and trustee were strangers.
Carter v. Challen, 83 Ala. 135. But, by the doctrine of advancement, the
rule seems to be well settled that where the above conditions have arisen,
no trust will be declared if the parties stood in the position of loco
parentis; and this applies to husband and wife. Viers v. Viers, 175 Mo.
444; Hamilton v. Hubbard, x34 Cal. 6o3. And in accord, where one con-
veys his interest in property, real or personal, absolutely, he cannot after-
wards impose a trust upon the grantee. Alden v. Withrow, ixo U. S. 119.
